Prof Joseph Sekhampu, the Chief Director of the NWU Business School writes:

Nearly 70 000 residents of JB Marks went to the polls last week, but the election has left the municipality without a clear governing majority. The ANC finished first with 33.2% of the combined vote, narrowly ahead of the DA on 31.8%. Fewer than 2 000 votes separate the two parties in a municipality where control of the council will depend on negotiations with smaller parties. The result has created a political contest in which electoral strength and bargaining power are no longer closely aligned.

The ANC has suffered a substantial setback, falling from 33 seats in 2021 to a provisional 22 seats in the new 67-seat council. The DA has increased its representation from 17 to 21 seats, but its growth has not been sufficient to secure an alternative administration without coalition partners. The election has weakened the incumbent and strengthened its principal challenger without giving either party the authority to govern independently.

The arithmetic explains why the coming negotiations matter

A coalition involving the DA, VF Plus and ActionSA would command 32 seats, leaving it two short of an outright majority. An arrangement bringing together the ANC, EFF, BAAGI, PA, MK and SACP would hold 33 seats, also short of the required 34. BAAGI enters these negotiations with three seats, while the PA, ACDP and Concerned Potchefstroom Residents could influence the formation of a governing majority. The final outcome will depend on which parties are willing to cooperate and what each considers an acceptable price for its support. These calculations describe possible coalitions rather than agreements that have already been reached.

Political relationships, ideological differences and electoral constituencies will shape which combinations become viable

The ANC enters the negotiations with the advantages of incumbency and experience in managing relationships with smaller parties. The DA has an opportunity to displace the ANC, but assembling a majority will require compromises with parties whose political interests may not always align with its own. BAAGI’s three seats give it negotiating relevance because its support could help determine which political bloc gains control of the municipality.

The coming negotiations will involve more than agreement on service delivery priorities. The mayoralty, the speaker’s position, mayoral committee portfolios and committee leadership will form part of the bargaining over political authority. These positions matter because they influence how municipal priorities are determined, how administrative performance is monitored and how political responsibility is distributed. Control of an executive portfolio can provide a smaller party with influence that extends beyond the number of councillors it contributes to a coalition.

Horse-trading is an unavoidable feature of coalition government, but its consequences depend on what the participating parties exchange and how their agreements shape future decisions. A smaller party may reasonably seek executive representation in return for supporting a governing majority. The problem arises when political positions become rewards for coalition loyalty rather than instruments for improving municipal performance. A coalition can distribute offices successfully without establishing a shared commitment to the difficult decisions required for effective administration.

The first council sitting will provide an early indication of the balance of political power emerging from the negotiations. Parties will need to convert informal understandings into sufficient votes to elect council leadership. A governing arrangement resting on the narrowest possible majority will remain vulnerable to absences, defections and disagreements over future decisions. The election of a mayor will establish who controls the executive, but subsequent budget votes and council decisions will reveal whether the coalition has developed a durable basis for cooperation.

The stakes extend beyond the council chamber

Potchefstroom’s businesses and university community depend on reliable infrastructure, predictable municipal accounts and functioning public services. Residents of Ikageng, Promosa and Ventersdorp have equally pressing expectations of the next administration. These communities will experience the consequences of coalition bargaining through decisions about infrastructure maintenance, revenue collection and the allocation of municipal resources.

The ANC must now decide how much authority it is prepared to surrender to remain in government, while the DA must establish whether it can assemble an alternative majority without compromising its governing ambitions. BAAGI and the smaller parties face a different calculation because their immediate bargaining advantage could become a political liability if the administration they support fails to deliver. The allocation of the mayoralty, speaker’s position and executive portfolios will provide the first indication of how these competing interests have been reconciled.

The next two weeks will reveal who has secured political control of JB Marks, but the more revealing contest will begin when the new executive confronts the municipality’s inherited obligations and administrative weaknesses. A party that negotiates control of a portfolio also assumes responsibility for the decisions made within it.

Residents should therefore remember which parties demanded authority over particular functions and judge them against the performance of those functions. The horse-trading may take place behind closed doors, but its consequences will eventually become visible in municipal accounts, infrastructure projects and the reliability of everyday services.

• The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of the Potchefstroom Herald.