During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested heavily in the armed forces of numerous African states. This trend continued intermittently after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with both Russia and Ukraine selling ex-Soviet-era and, more recently, modernised military equipment into Africa. Africa was, and remains, a large consumer of military equipment, which includes small arms, aircraft, fighting vehicles and ammunition. Arming African states has long been how East and West work to expand their influence through direct involvement or proxy forces in, especially resource-rich, countries. The sales of military equipment – much of it either…
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested heavily in the armed forces of numerous African states. This trend continued intermittently after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with both Russia and Ukraine selling ex-Soviet-era and, more recently, modernised military equipment into Africa.
Africa was, and remains, a large consumer of military equipment, which includes small arms, aircraft, fighting vehicles and ammunition. Arming African states has long been how East and West work to expand their influence through direct involvement or proxy forces in, especially resource-rich, countries.
The sales of military equipment – much of it either antiquated or not suitable to an African combat environment – and the engagement of numerous foreign militaries on so-called training missions has not dramatically increased the efficacy of African military forces.
Foreign advisory and training missions often try to recreate African armies in their own image. With this approach has come the injection of military doctrines that are disconnected with the African realities of conflict, the enemy and the terrain.
This doctrinal mismatch has been entrenched with substandard training, in many instances giving anti-government forces numerous operational and tactical advantages.
For several years now, I have been cautioning African military forces about what I consider to be potential future defence and security problems: the lack of realistic, sustainable and intelligence-driven strategies, the restructuring of their armed forces, the failure to reassess doctrines and make adjustments, the importance of informational dominance, the folly of neglecting technology as a force multiplier and the value of a professional and strong noncommissioned officer corps.
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These concerns and warnings have never been taken seriously. The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Armed Forces will present Africa with numerous future challenges. These will not only impact on daily necessities, but will also have an enormous future knock-on effect.
Given the huge amounts of ammunition and equipment the Russians committed to the Ukrainian conflict, along with the fierce resistance offered by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the ammunition expended and equipment losses on both sides have been nothing short of staggering.
These need to be continually replaced by both countries and will continue when the war is finally over. Russia will continue to suffer from the international sanctions imposed on it regarding technology.
The Russian-Ukrainian war has also highlighted many important lessons African armed forces will need to appreciate to determine their relevance to their areas of operations and responsibilities.
These include the absolute criticality of sound intelligence in the development of campaign strategies, the folly of underestimating an opponent, the importance of logistics, the value of encrypted communications, the use of artillery fire, the impact of weather on terrain, the imperativeness of air support and the power of national unity.
Western-supplied equipment has been able to exploit the vulnerabilities of Russian equipment, especially insofar as multiple launch rocket and anti-armour weapon systems are concerned.
The Russian use of overwhelming artillery fire, much of it apparently directed at civilian targets, regardless of collateral damage, has likewise been condemned. The war has highlighted many innovations and how an invading force can have its momentum impeded and its operational tempo eroded.
The deployment of drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as for the adjustment of indirect fire and the deployment of weaponised commercial drones for specific targeting, are examples.
Equally, gaining informational dominance through the application of a structured and supportive media strategy is critical if one needs to shape perceptions, influence domestic and international public opinion and gain the moral high ground.
These, along with many others, are important lessons to note. What ought to be of immediate concern to African armed forces is the fact that both countries have already delved into their first-line reserve and second-line equipment.
In addition, the military industries of both countries have suffered setbacks, ranging from the destruction of factories to the acquiring of microchips and other high-tech elements, materials, and parts. To rebuild their military industries, replace equipment losses and replenish ammunition stocks, as well as re-equip their atrophied armed forces is going to take years – and at great cost.
The West, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and other countries have likewise provided critical military equipment and finances to Ukraine. The armed forces of many African states are equipped with Soviet-era or more recent Russian and Ukrainian equipment.
Not only has the invasion highlighted the vulnerabilities of, especially the older Russian equipment, it has also highlighted the folly of what appears to be doctrinal disconnects. It will become increasingly problematic for African armies to acquire ammunition and spares for their equipment, or to maintain it in good combat order.
Unless African forces start developing their own defence industries to counter current and predicted threats, they will become willing victims of the fallout of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. v Barlow is chair of Executive Outcomes.
